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AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: NATIONAL ORGANIC 
STANDARDS, LABELING AND SECOND-GENERATION OF GM PRODUCTS 
 
Abstract – This paper examines the effect of the introduction of labels for products of biotechnology on 
the markets for GM, conventional, and organic food products. In addition, the paper analyzes the market 
and welfare effects of the introduction of consumer-oriented, second-generation GM products. Analytical 
results show that while a no-labeling regime is generally beneficial for the organic sector, when 
segregation costs are sufficiently high the introduction of labels for GM products can enhance the 
consumption share and growth of the organic sector while driving the conventional products out of the 
market. The analysis also reveals that the introduction of the consumer-oriented GM products can change 
the nature of the relationship between GM and conventional and organic products from one of vertical to 
one of horizontal product differentiation and can enhance both consumer welfare and the market 
acceptance and growth of agricultural biotechnology. When the value consumers place on the new 
product is sufficiently high, the introduction of the consumer-oriented GM products can drive the first-
generation of GM products and their conventional counterparts out of the market while reducing the 
consumer demand for organic food. Overall, the market and welfare effects of GM labeling and the 
introduction of the consumer-oriented GM products are determined by the size of marketing and 
segregation costs under labeling of GM products, the level of consumer aversion to genetic engineering, 
the production share of the GM product in the no-labeling case, the structure of the agricultural 
biotechnology sector, and the benefits consumers perceive from the second-generation of GM products.      2
AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIC AGRICULTURE: NATIONAL ORGANIC 
STANDARDS, LABELING AND SECOND-GENERATION OF GM PRODUCTS 
 
The introduction of genetically modified products (GMPs) into the food system and the significant 
growth of organic agriculture are among the most notable features of the increasingly industrialized agri-
food sector. They have both received significant attention in the agricultural economics literature with the 
main focus being on the optimal regulatory responses as they relate to the introduction of standards for, 
and labeling of, GM and organic food products.  
Labeling of GMPs has been a contentious issue sparking an ongoing international debate among 
parties holding significantly different views on the need for regulation of products of biotechnology. 
While the European Union advocates mandatory labeling (or even banning) of products of biotechnology 
based on its “precautionary principle” and the vocal consumer opposition to GMPs, the United States 
(US) have argued the “substantial equivalency” of producer-oriented, first-generation GMPs to their 
conventional counterparts and have been opposing the labeling of these products. Consumer opposition to 
the first-generation GMPs has hurt the prospects of the agricultural biotechnology sector and resulted in 
efforts by life science companies for the development of consumer-oriented, second-generation GMPs.   
At the same time, the process of establishing national standards for organic food generated a 
significant public response in the US with the dialogue among the interest groups extending over a good 
part of the last decade. The debate over the establishment of the national organic standards ended last year 
with the introduction of the National Organic Program (NOP). In addition to affecting the organic sector 
with the provision of a clear understanding as to what an organic label really means, an important feature 
of the NOP is that it explicitly links the markets for organic and GM products. In particular, one of the 
provisions of NOP is that food labeled as organic should be free of GM ingredients. 
Given the credence nature of the producer-oriented, first-generation GMPs and the consequent 
inability of the American consumer to observe the nature of the product under the current “no labeling” 
regime, the introduction of NOP can be expected to have important ramifications for the markets of GM,   3
conventional, and organic food products. The reason is that, under the current regulatory framework, 
purchase of organic-labeled food provides the only option available to consumers averse to GMPs – the 
NOP has effectively made the organic label equivalent to a “GM-free” label.  
The objective of this paper is to identify the scope and significance of the newly introduced NOP 
and systematically analyze the effect of the introduction of labels for GMPs on the markets for GM, 
conventional, and organic food products. In particular, the paper analyzes consumer purchasing decisions 
and welfare under (i) no labeling and (ii) mandatory labeling of GMPs. The study builds on previous 
work by Giannakas and Fulton and Giannakas that examine the market and welfare effects of different 
regulatory and labeling regimes in markets for GM and organic products, respectively. While these 
studies have examined the two markets in isolation, this paper explicitly considers the demand links 
between GM and organic food product markets created by the new regulation governing the organic 
sector. In addition to analyzing the effect of labeling for the markets of organic and first-generation 
GMPs, the paper also examines the market and welfare effects of the introduction of consumer-oriented, 
second-generation GMPs (e.g., nutraceuticals).  
In analyzing the market and welfare effects of the introduction of labeling and consumer-oriented 
GMPs in the presence of the new organic standards, this paper explicitly considers differences in 
consumer preferences for GM, conventional and organic food products. Consumer heterogeneity in terms 
of preferences for different food products is a key component in our model and it is critical for explaining 
the coexistence of markets for products with different process attributes (i.e., produced through different 
production processes).   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents a simple model of 
heterogeneous consumer preferences. The sections following analyze consumer purchasing decisions and 
welfare with and without labeling of GMPs, and determine the market and welfare effects of the 
introduction of labels for GMPs. The ramifications from the introduction of consumer-oriented, second-
generation of GMPs are considered before the final section summarizes and concludes the paper.   4
Consumer Characteristics  
Consider a product that is available in its GM, conventional (non-GM) and organic form.
1 The GM, 
conventional and organic versions of this good are treated as vertically differentiated products – if offered 
at the same price all consumers would prefer the organic version of the product, while if only the 
conventional and GM versions were available and priced the same, all consumers would buy the 
conventional form of the product. While the GM, conventional and organic forms of the product are, by 
definition, uniformly quality ranked by consumers, consumers differ in their willingness to pay for the 
perceived quality differences between the three goods. To capture these elements, consider a consumer that 
consumes one unit of either the GM, the conventional, or the organic form of the product in question and 
the purchasing decision represents a small share of her total budget. Her utility function can be written as:  
 
γα − − = gm gm p U U     if a unit of GM product is consumed, 
(1)  δα − − = c c p U U     if a unit of conventional (non-GM) product is consumed, and 
βα + − = o o p U U     if a unit of organic product is consumed 
 
where  gm U ,  c U and  o U  is the utility associated with purchasing one unit of the GM, the conventional and 
the organic version of the product, respectively. The price of the GM product is  gm p , the price of its 
conventional counterpart is  c p , and the price of the organic product is  o p . The parameter U is the per unit 
utility from the consumption of the physical product and is common to all consumers (see below). The 
terms γ and δ are utility discount factors associated with the consumption of GM and conventional products, 
respectively, while β is a utility enhancement factor associated with the consumption of the organic product. 
The parameter α takes values between zero and one and differs according to consumer capturing  
heterogeneous consumer preferences (and thus, heterogeneous willingness to pay) for the three products.
2  
                                                 
1 One example of a product that could be supplied in a conventional, GM and organic form is tomato. A second 
example could be corn chips (made from conventional, organic or GM corn).   
2 Note that consumers with an α value of zero would be indifferent between the GM, organic, and conventional 
versions of the product if those were offered at the same price. To conform with the assumption of vertical product 
differentiation, it is assumed that those consumers will prefer the organic version of the product.    5
In the context of this paper, the characteristic α can be seen as capturing differences in consumer 
preferences with regards to the process attributes of the three goods – the way they have been produced. 
The greater is α, the greater is the consumer aversion to (and the discount in utility from the consumption 
of) goods whose production is facilitated either by genetic engineering (i.e., GM products) or by the 
application of chemical fertilizers and pesticides (i.e., conventional products), and the greater is the utility 
derived from the organically grown version of the product.  
  Put in a different way, the utility function in equation (1) is based on the assumption that the good 
has two attributes – the first of these is the set of physical characteristics of the good, while the second is 
the process through which the good is produced. The utility of the good is assumed to be the sum of the 
utilities associated with each of these two attributes.  
The first component of equation (1) – the term  }) , , { ( o c gm i p U i ∈ −  – shows the net consumer 
benefit derived from the physical characteristics of the product. The parameter U is a per unit willingness 
to pay for the physical attributes of the product. Subtracting the price of the product from this willingness-
to-pay value gives the net utility associated with the physical characteristics. 
The second component of equation (1) gives the value placed on the process through which the 
good is produced – this is the component -γα for the GM product, the component -δα for the conventional 
product, and the component βα for the organic product. Thus, for a consumer with attribute α, the terms 
γα and δα give the utility discount from consuming the GM and conventional product, respectively, while 
the term βα is the utility enhancement from consuming the organic version of the product.  
To capture the consumer resistance to genetic modification (Hobbs and Plunkett), we assume that 
γ >δ with the difference γ -δ  reflecting the level of consumer aversion to GM products. For tractability, 
the analysis assumes that consumers are uniformly distributed between the polar values of α. The 
implications of relaxing this assumption are straightforward and are discussed throughout the text.    6
 
Consumer Decisions when GM Products are Not Labeled 
Consider first the situation where the GM version of the product is not labeled (while the organic version 
is). In this case, the GM and conventional products are marketed together, and the price faced by the 
consumer,  nl p , is the same regardless of which product is purchased. Note that when the GM product is 
not labeled, the information regarding the nature of the offering is asymmetric; while producers know 
whether the product is GM or conventional, the presence or absence of genetic modification are not 
detectable by consumers with either search or experience (i.e., genetic modification is a credence 
attribute; see Darby and Karni and Nelson). The lack of information about the type of the product being 
sold means that consumers are uncertain about the nature of the product they purchase. Assuming a 
probability of ψ that the non-labeled product purchased is GM, consumer utility is now:
3 
   
  φα − − = nl nl p U U   if a unit of non-labeled product is consumed, and   
(2) 
  βα + − = o o p U U   if a unit of the certified organic product is consumed 
 
where  nl U  is the expected utility associated with the unit consumption of the non-labeled product (i.e., 
() [] ( )[ ] δα ψ γα ψ ψ ψ − − − + − − = − + = nl nl c gm nl p U p U U U U 1 1 ) and  () . 1 δ ψ ψγ φ − + =   
  A consumer’s purchasing decision is determined by comparing the utilities derived from the non-
labeled product and its organic counterpart. Figure 1 illustrates the decisions and welfare of consumers. 
The upward sloping curve graphs utility levels when the organic product is purchased, while the 
downward sloping line shows the utility when the non-labeled product is purchased for different levels of 
the differentiating attribute α. The intersection of the two utility curves determines the level of the 
differentiating attribute that corresponds to the indifferent consumer. The consumer with differentiating 
characteristic  nl α  given by:  
                                                 
3 The probability that the non-labeled product is GM can be seen as reflecting the share of the GM product in total 
production of the non-labeled good. The greater is the production share of the GM version of the product, the greater 






= ⇒ = nl o
nl o nl nl
p p
U U : 
 
is indifferent between consuming a unit of non-labeled product and a unit of the organic – the utility of 
consuming these two products is the same. Consumers “located” to the left of  nl α  (i.e., consumers with 
α∈[0,  nl α )) purchase the non-labeled product while those located to the right of  nl α  (i.e., consumers 
with α∈( nl α , 1]) buy its organic counterpart. Aggregate consumer welfare is given by the area 
underneath the effective utility curve shown as the (bold dashed) kinked curve in Figure 1. 
  When consumers are uniformly distributed with respect to their differentiating attribute α, the 
level of α corresponding to the indifferent consumer,  nl α , also determines the market share of the non-
labeled product. The market share of the organic is given by 1- nl α . By normalizing the mass of 
consumers at unity, the market shares give the consumer demands for the non-labeled,  nl x , and the 
organic version of the product,  o x , respectively (Mussa and Rosen). In what follows, the terms “market 
share” and “demand” will be used interchangeably to denote nl x  or/and  o x . Formally,  nl x  and  o x  can be 
written as: 
 




















Note that because the products are vertically differentiated, if  nl o p p ≤  all consumers will buy the 
organic product (i.e.,  1 = o x  and  0 = nl x ). Put in a different way, for any (positive) quantity of the non-
labeled product to be demanded (i.e., for  nl x  to be positive),  nl p  should be less than  o p . In fact, there 
are two reasons why the non-labeled product will be priced lower than its organic counterpart. First, 
organic food producers must incur certification costs that have been estimated to account for 2% to 5% of 
total sales value (FAO). Furthermore, labeling of organic foods means increased segregation costs   8
incurred by organic producers in keeping their produce separate from conventional and GM produce. The 
costs associated with product certification and identity preservation cause consumer price to rise. Second, 
it is assumed that the supply of organic food entails increased production costs. Some, if not all, of the 
additional cost will be transferred to the consumer of the organic product.  
  Comparative statics results can be shown graphically. A reduction in  o p  shifts the  o U  curve 
upwards and increases  o x , while a reduction in  nl p  causes an upward shift of the  nl U  curve and a 














). An increase in the utility discount factor φ (due to an 
increase in the production share of the GM product ψ and/or an increase in the consumer aversion to GM 
products γ-δ ) causes a rightward rotation of the  nl U  curve through the intercept at  nl p U − , which  






The analysis can be easily modified to examine cases where consumers are not uniformly 
distributed with respect to their value of α. When the distribution of consumers is continuous (but not 
uniform), the consumer demand for the different products depends on its skewness, i.e., the more skewed 
is the distribution towards 1, the greater is the market share of, and the demand for, the organic product 
when the GM and conventional products are marketed together (i.e., GM products are not labeled).   
 
Consumer Decisions under Labeling of GM Products 
Consider now the consumer choice problem in an institutional arrangement with a mandatory GM labeling 
regime in place. In this case, conventional and GM products are segregated and marketed separately and 
consumers have a choice between the conventional product, the GM-labeled product, and their certified 
organic counterpart.
4 Consumer utility in this case is given by equation (1) and a consumer’s purchasing  
decision is determined by the relative utilities derived from the consumption of the three goods.  
                                                 
4 While the analysis assumes that only the GM product is legally required to be labeled, the results are more general 
and apply to the cases where only the conventional or both the GM and conventional products have to be labeled. 
Specifically, when only GM products are labeled, unlabeled products will be perceived as conventional. Similarly, if 
conventional products are legally required to be labeled as such, unlabeled products will be perceived as being GM.   9
Note that the GM and conventional products are not necessarily priced the same. Given the 
vertical differentiation of the three products and the uniform quality ranking by consumers, for any 
positive quantity of the GM-labeled product to be demanded,  gm p  should be less than  c p . Similarly, for 
any positive quantity of the conventional product to be demanded,  c p  should be less than  o p . As pointed 
out by Giannakas and Fulton, there are two reasons why the GM product will be priced lower than its 
conventional counterpart. First, mandatory labeling means increased marketing and segregation costs. 
These transaction costs associated with identity preservation cause consumer prices to rise. The majority 
of these costs are incurred in the conventional product chain (see Bullock and Nitsi and Giannakas and 
Fulton), which, in turn, implies that consumers of the conventional product face a greater price increase.
5  
Second, the producer-oriented, first-generation GM technology generates production cost savings 
at the farm level. Some, if not all, of the cost savings may be transmitted to the consumer of the GM 
product. While the conventional product is expected to be priced higher than the GM product, it is 
expected to be priced lower than its organic counterpart for the reasons mentioned in the previous section 
(i.e., certification, segregation and higher production costs incurred in the organic product supply chain).  
Figure 2 depicts the consumption decisions under mandatory labeling of GMPs when 
o c gm p p p < <  and the consumer preferences are such that all three products enjoy positive shares of the 
market. In this case, the consumption share of the GM product,  gm x , is determined by the intersection of 











while the demand for the organic product, 
'
o x , is given by  T α − 1  where  T α  corresponds to the consumer  
who is indifferent between consuming the conventional product and its organic counterpart (i.e.,   
                                                 
5 As Giannakas and Fulton point out, “when any type of labeling occurs, traditional and GM products will have to be 
segregated. The segregation costs will always be higher for producers of the traditional product due to the effort required to 
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Finally, the market share of, and the demand for the conventional product,  c x , is given by  ( )
' 1 o gm x x + −  or 
 
(8) 
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β δ γ
− +
− − − − −
=
gm c gm o c o
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The preceding analysis indicates that the market shares of the three products are determined by 
the consumer attitudes towards GM, conventional, and organic products and their relative prices which 
are determined, in turn, by the relative size of the segregation and labeling costs, the cost savings 
associated with the GM technology, and the market power in the GM product supply chain (which 
determines the extent to which production costs savings are transferred to the consumers). 
Equation (8) indicates that when the price of the GM version of the product is significantly lower 
than the price of its conventional counterpart and/or when the price premium paid for the organic product 
is relatively low and/or when the consumer aversion to GM products is not significant, the conventional 
product will be driven out of the market (i.e.,  0 = c x ) – consumers with relatively low values of the 
differentiating attribute α will opt buying the cheaper GM product while consumers with relatively high 
values of α  will prefer consuming the organic.  
Formally, when the combination of prices ( gm p ,  c p , and  o p ) and preference parameters (γ, δ, 
and β) are such that the expression in equation (8) is less than or equal to zero, the utility curve  c U  in 
Figure 2 lies underneath the curves  gm U  or/and  o U  for all consumers (i.e., ∀α) and  0 = c x . In this case, 
the demand for the GM product, 
+
gm x , is determined by the intersection of  gm U  and  o U  (i.e., 
o gm gm U U x =










The demand for the organic product, 
+
o x , is then given by 
+ − gm x 1 o r :  
 











In this case, the consumer demand for the GM (organic) product falls (increases) as  gm p  and/or the 



























































The Welfare and Market Effects of GM Labeling  
After having analyzed the consumer purchasing decisions and welfare under the no-labeling and labeling 
regimes, we can now determine the ramifications of GM labeling for the welfare of consumers and the 
demand for the GM, the conventional and organic food products. Figure 3 depicts the effective utility 
curves under no labeling (dashed kinked curve) and mandatory labeling (solid kinked curve) when the 
marketing and segregation costs associated with mandatory labeling of GMPs are relatively low. In this 
case, the relative prices are  o c nl gm p p p p < < < , the utility curve  c U  lies above  gm U  and  o U  over 
some values of α and  0 > c x .         
When segregation costs are relatively low, the introduction of labels increases consumer welfare 
by the shaded area ∆CW in Figure 3 while reducing the consumer demand for the organic product. In 
particular, consumers will relatively low aversion to interventions in the production process (i.e., 
consumers with α∈[0,  gm α )) realize an increase in their welfare because the utility increase from the 
purchase of the cheaper GM product outweighs the utility discount from its consumption. At the same 
time, for consumers with intermediate values of α (i.e., consumers with α∈( gm α ,  nl α )) the utility   12
increase from the consumption of the (identity preserved) conventional product exceeds the utility 
discount from its higher price.  
In addition, the availability of the conventional non-GM product in the labeling case eliminates 
the exclusivity of the organic sector in the supply of GM-free product and results in some consumers that 
would purchase the organic product under the no-labeling regime switching to its conventional 
counterpart. In particular, when segregation and labeling costs are relatively low, consumers with 
α∈( nl α ,  T α ) find it optimal to switch their consumption from the organic to the cheaper conventional 
product.
6 Overall, when segregation and labeling costs are relatively low, the introduction of labels 
enhances consumer welfare, reduces the demand for organic products while sustaining a consumer 
demand for all three products – GM, conventional, and organic.  
Obviously, when the assumption of a uniform distribution of consumers is relaxed, the welfare 
and market effects of mandatory labeling depend on the skewness of the distribution. In general, the 
greater is the number of consumers that are characterised by a relatively low aversion to interventions in 
the production process (i.e., the more skewed towards zero is the distribution of consumers with respect to 
their value of α), the greater are the welfare gains from the introduction of labels and the lower are the 
consumer demands for conventional and organic food products. 
Comparative statics results can easily be derived from Figure 3. For instance, an increase in the 
likelihood that the non-labeled product is GM (i.e., an increase in ψ) causes a clockwise rotation of the 
nl U  curve that increases both ∆CW and the portion of consumers that switch their consumption from the 
organic product to its conventional counterpart under labeling of GMPs. Similarly, an increase in the 
market power in the GM supply chain will increase  gm p  and will shift the  gm U  curve downwards. The 
outcome is reduced consumer benefits from the introduction of labels and increased demand for the 
conventional product. Finally, an increase in the marketing and segregation costs associated with labeling 
                                                 
6 Implicit in the analysis is the presumption of supply adjustments to market demands i.e., the reduction in demand 
for organic food is “matched” by a move of productive resources away from the organic sector. Note that po also 
remains unaffected when the supply of the organic product is perfectly elastic.   13
of GMPs will increase the prices of the GM and conventional products which will shift the  c U  and  gm U  
curves downward and will reduce ∆CW.  
As mentioned earlier, the price effect of the increased segregation costs will be more profound in 
the conventional product supply chain (i.e., the downward shift of  c U  will exceed the one of  gm U ) which 
will result in reduced demand for the conventional product and increased demand for its organic 
counterpart. The greater are the marketing and segregation costs, the lower are the consumer welfare 
gains from the introduction of labels, the lower is the consumer demand for the (identity preserved) 
conventional product, and the greater is the demand for the organic product. For sufficiently high 
segregation costs the conventional product is driven out of the market (i.e.,  c U  lies underneath  gm U  
or/and  o U  ∀α and  0 = c x ), and the demand faced by the organic sector can exceed the one under no-
labeling of GMPs. Figure 4 depicts the consumer decisions and welfare under this scenario. The dotted 
and hatched areas in Figure 4 represent the gains and losses, respectively, in consumer welfare due to 
labeling of GMPs. 
The reasoning behind this (counterintuitive) increase in the demand for the organic product under 
labeling of GMPs is as follows. The exit from the market of the conventional product when marketing and 
segregation costs are high, restores the exclusivity of the organic sector in supplying a product free of GM 
ingredients (an exclusivity that is lost when conventional (non-GM) product is present). In addition to 
avoiding the loss of consumers to the conventional product (consumers with α∈( nl α ,  T α ) in Figure 3), 
the increased segregation costs make the (ceteris paribus) least desired GM alternative more costly. For 
certain values of the prices and preference parameters,  gm U  lies below  nl U  at the point of intersection 
with the  o U  curve which results in increased demand for the organic product under labeling of GMPs.  
In Figure 5,  c p  is graphed against γ, the utility discount from the consumption of the GM 
product. The shaded area NC in Figure 5 shows those combinations of  c p  and γ that result in a lack of 
demand for the conventional product, i.e.,  0 = c x . The size and shape of this area is determined by the   14
position of its lower boundary (i.e., curve 
( ) ( )
β γ







p ) which, in turn, is determined by 
the prices of the GM and organic products, and the preference parameters β and δ. In general, the 
likelihood that there will be no demand for the identity preserved conventional product increases with a 
reduction in  gm p ,  o p  and δ, and falls with a reduction in β. 
Finally, Figure 6 depicts the combinations of the price of the organic product,  o p , and the 
preference parameter associated with its consumption, β, that result in increased demand for the organic 
product in the GM labeling regime. The combinations of  o p  and β that result in increased  o x  are shown 
by the shaded area OG  in Figure 6. The size and shape of this area depend on  c p ,  nl p , the share of the 
GM product to total production of the non-labeled good, ψ, and the preference parameters γ and δ. In 
general, the likelihood that the organic sector will benefit from the introduction of labels for GMPs 
increases with an increase in the price of the conventional product (due to high segregation costs) and the 
consumer aversion to GM products (due to an increase in γ or/and a reduction in δ), and falls with an 
increase in the price of the non-labeled product,  nl p . 
 
Ramifications from the Introduction of Consumer-Oriented, Second Generation of GMPs 
While the previous analysis applies to the producer-oriented, first-generation of GM products, the model 
can be extended, with some modification, to analyze the consequences from the introduction of 
consumer-oriented GM food. Since, by definition, the consumer-oriented, second-generation GM 
technology focuses on altering the characteristics of the product (by adding vitamin A to rice for 
instance), the “substantive equivalency” between GMPs and conventional products breaks down and so 
does the US argument that has sustained the current no-labeling of products of biotechnology. 
Consequently, it is reasonable to assume that the second-generation of GMPs (new-GMPs, hereafter) will 
be governed by a labeling regime. In this context, we will proceed in analyzing the market and welfare 
effects of the introduction of labeled new-GMPs relative to the current no-labeling regime.   15
With the introduction of new-GMPs there are three goods in the market – the new-GMP, the non-
labeled product,
7 and the organic product. If the new generation of GM products manages to possess 
attributes valued by consumers, the consumer utility function becomes: 
 




gm p V U U   if a unit of the new-GMP is consumed, 
(11)  φα − − = nl nl p U U     if a unit of the non-labeled product is consumed, and  




gm U  is the utility associated with the unit consumption of the new consumer-oriented GM product, 
V is the value consumers place on the new product attribute (e.g., vitamin A in rice), and 
N
gm p  is the price 
of the new-GMP. All other variables are as previously defined. Note that the utility discount factor 
associated with the consumption of the GM product, γ, is not affected from the introduction of the new-
GMPs since it reflects consumer attitudes towards genetic engineering – the process through which (first- 
and second-generation) GMPs are produced.  
What the introduction of the consumer-oriented GMPs does change, however, is the utility 
associated with their consumption – the value consumers place on the (enhanced) physical characteristics 
of the product. For simplicity and without loss of generality, the utility increase from the introduction of 
consumer-oriented GMPs is assumed to be constant across consumers. Obviously, if the value consumers 
place on the new product attribute increases (decreases) with the differentiating characteristic α, the 
outcome will be a reduction (increase) in the effective utility discount factor associated with the 
consumption of the new-GMP.  
It is important to note that the introduction of the consumer-oriented, second-generation of GMPs 
alters the nature of the relationship between the (new) products of biotechnology and their conventional 
and organic counterparts. In particular, for certain values of the preference parameters, β, γ, δ, and V, the 
                                                 
7 Due to the “substantive equivalency” between the first-generation GMP and the conventional product, these two 
offerings are marketed together (i.e., they are not labeled).   16
inclusion of the new product attribute that confers value to consumers results in the new-GMPs being 
horizontally (rather than vertically) differentiated with respect to their conventional and organic 
counterparts. In this case, unlike the first-generation GMPs that are uniformly quality ranked by 
consumers relative to the conventional and organic products, the new-GMPs are not uniformly quality 
ranked neither with the conventional products nor with their organic counterparts.
8  
The market and welfare effects of the introduction of the second-generation of GMPs are 
straightforward and depend on the value consumers place on the new product attribute V, the price of the new-
GMP, 
N
gm p  (which is determined by the structure of the biotechnology sector and the segregation costs 
required in keeping the new-GMP separate from the first-generation GM and conventional produce), the level 
of consumer aversion to genetic engineering, γ-δ, and the share of the first-generation GMP to the total 
production of the non-labeled product, ψ. Figure 7 depicts the case in which V exceeds the price difference 
between the new-GMP and the non-labeled product,  nl
N
gm p p − , and the parameters γ, δ, and ψ are such that 
all three products (i.e., the new-GMP, the non-labeled, and the organic product) enjoy positive market shares.  
In such a case, the new-GMP attracts consumers with relatively low values of α (i.e., consumers 
with α∈[0, 
N
gm α )) and the consumption share for the non-labeled product falls by the same amount (i.e., 
the demand for the new-GMP). The market for the organic product remains unaffected in this case since 
the introduction of the new-GMP results in consumers switching their consumption from the non-labeled 
good to the new-GMP. Formally, the consumption shares of (and the demands for) the new-GMP, 
N
gm x , 
the non-labeled, 
"
nl x , and the organic products, 
"
o x , are given by: 
                                                 
8 It can be shown that, when only new-GMPs and conventional products are available and they are offered at the same 
price, consumers with relatively low aversion to process interventions (consumers with α∈[0, 
δ γ −
V
)) will prefer the 
new-GMPs while the rest of the consumers (i.e., consumers with α∈[
δ γ −
V
, 1) will prefer the conventional product. 




) will purchase the new-GMP and the rest (i.e., consumers with α∈[
γ β +
V
, 1) will buy the organic product.   17
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The greater is the value consumers place on the new attribute of the new-GMP, or/and the smaller 
is the price difference between the new-GMP and the non-labeled product, or/and the lower is the 
consumer aversion to genetic engineering, or/and the higher is the share of the first-generation GM 
product to the total production of the non-labeled good, the greater is the share of the new-GMP and the 
lower is the share of the non-labeled product. When  ( ) () nl o nl
N






, the non-labeled 
products (i.e., first-generation GM and conventional products) are driven out of the market since 
consumers with relatively low values of the differentiating attribute α will opt buying the new-GMP 
while consumers with relatively high values of α will prefer consuming the organic.  
Formally, when  () () nl o nl
N






, the utility curve  nl U  in Figure 7 lies 
underneath the curves 
N
gm U  or/and  o U  for all consumers (i.e., ∀α) and  0
" = nl x . In this case, the demand 
for the new-GMP, 
N
gm x , is determined by the intersection of 
N












while the demand for the organic product falls to: 
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Equations (15) and (16) show that the demand for the new-GM (organic) product falls (increases) 
as 
N
gm p  and the preference parameters γ  and β increase, and rises (falls) with an increase in V and/or  o p  











































































). Obviously, when  ( )
N
gm o p p V − − + ≥ γ β , all consumers will prefer the new-GMP. 
Before concluding the paper, it should be noted that, no matter what the market effects are, the 
introduction of the new-GMP has an unambiguous positive effect on aggregate consumer welfare. In 
particular, relative to the status quo case of no-labeling, the introduction of consumer-oriented, second-
generation of GM products increases the welfare of consumers with relatively low aversion to production 
process interventions. Interestingly, the consumers who gain from the introduction of the new-GMPs are 
exactly those who find it optimal to consume the new product. In this context, the parameters affecting 
the market demand for the new-GMP also affect the consumer welfare gains from the new technology. 
Thus, consumer gains rise with an increase in the value added to the product from the new technology, 
and fall with an increase in the price of the new-GMPs, the consumer aversion to genetic modification, 
and the production share of the first-generation GM product.  
 
Summary and Concluding Remarks 
This paper develops a model of heterogeneous consumer preferences to examine the effect of the 
introduction of labels for products of biotechnology on the markets for GM, conventional, and organic 
food products. In addition to analyzing the market and welfare effects of labeling the first-generation of 
GM products, the paper also examines the economic consequences from the introduction of consumer-
oriented, second-generation GMPs (e.g., nutraceuticals).  
Analytical results show that the introduction of labels for the first-generation of GMPs has 
important ramifications for the markets of organic, conventional and GM products. The market and 
welfare effects of labeling are shown to depend on the size of the marketing and segregation costs under   19
mandatory labeling of GMPs, the distribution of consumer preferences and the level of aversion to GMPs, 
the production share of the GM product in the no-labeling case, and the structure of the agricultural 
biotechnology sector.  
It is shown that, while a no-labeling regime for products of biotechnology is generally beneficial 
for the organic sector, when segregation costs are sufficiently high the introduction of labels for GMPs 
can enhance the consumption share and growth of the organic sector while driving the conventional 
products out of the market. While high segregation costs associated with labeling of GMPs may benefit 
the organic sector, they have the opposite effect on consumer welfare since, the greater are these costs, the 
lower are the consumer welfare gains from the introduction of labels.  
The analysis also reveals the potential for significant benefits from the introduction of the 
consumer-oriented, second-generation of GM products both for consumer welfare and the market 
acceptance and growth of agricultural biotechnology. The introduction of the new-GMPs can change the 
nature of the relationship between the GM and the conventional and organic products from one of vertical 
to one of horizontal product differentiation and results in an unambiguous increase in aggregate consumer 
welfare. The magnitude of this welfare increase is shown to depend on the value consumers place on the 
new product, the price of the new-GMP, the level of consumer aversion to genetic engineering, and the 
production share of the first-generation of GMPs under the no-labeling regime.  
Finally, the analysis shows that when the value consumers place on the new product is 
sufficiently high, the introduction of the new-GMPs can drive the first-generation of GMPs and their 
conventional counterparts out of the market while reducing the consumer demand for organic products. In 
this context, while the development of the second-generation, consumer-oriented GMPs can provide the 
boost desired (and needed) by the agricultural biotechnology sector, it can eliminate the conventional and 
first-generation GM products, and slow down the significant growth experienced by organic agriculture.    
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Figure 1.   Consumption Decisions and Welfare under No Labeling of GM Food. 
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Figure 2.   Consumption Decisions and Welfare under Labeling of GM Food. 
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Figure 3.   Labeling vs. No Labeling of GM Food (Low Segregation Costs). 
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